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LEGISLATIVE DELEGATION OF
POWERS: A HOBSON'S CHOICE?
RODOLPHE

I.

J.A.

DE SEIFE*

INTRODUCTION

The day after the Chadha decision was handed down,' one
of my friends, a constitutional lawyer of repute, stated flatly that
Chadha was potentially one of the major Supreme Court decisions of the Twentieth Century: I believe that this is an overstatement of the historic significance of that case.
At first blush one might readily agree with Justice White's
2
assessment of the apparent impact of the Chadha decision.
The sweeping statement by the majority as to the unconstitutionality of the legislative veto is, on its face, an unusual departure from the Supreme Court's normal reluctance to squarely
face a constitutional issue,3 and when it does so, to then limit
the reach of its decision to the narrowest area possible. 4 In that
* J.D., Catholic University of America (1955); LL.M., George Washington University Law Center (1965). Member of the District of Columbia and
Maryland Bars. Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of
Law. I gratefully acknowledge the hard work of my Student Research Assistants, Tom Balgeman and Joseph McGraw in checking the footnotes, and
the editorial suggestions by Mr. McGraw; Ms. Julie Oster, for her patience
in retyping this manuscript several times and for deciphering my hieroglyphics deserves special recognition. Any errors or weaknesses in this
presentation are mine.
1. The decision was issued on June 23, 1983. Immigration and Naturali-

zation Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
2. "Today the Court not only invalidates § 244(c) (2) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, but also sounds the death knell for nearly 200 other
statutory provisions in which Congress has reserved a 'legislative veto'."
Id. at 2793 (White, J., dissenting). See also Mark S. Pulliam, Esq., in his
book review in 69 ABAJ. 1724 ("(T)he invalidation of legislative vetoes will
have an enormous impact on the political aspect of regulation ....").
3. "When faced with problems of whether particular issues are properly presented for adjudication, courts frequently allude to judicial restraints as a reason for hesitation about passing on the merits." Brilmayer,
The Jurisprudenceof Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy"
Requirement. 93 Harv. L. Rev. 297, 302 (1979).
4. [The Supreme Court] has no jurisdiction to pronounce any statute, either of a State or of the United States, void, because irreconcilable with the Constitution, except as it is called upon to adjudge the
legal rights of litigants in actual controversies. In the exercise of that
jurisdiction, it is bound by two rules, to which it has rigidly adhered,
one, never to anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of
the necessity of deciding it; the other never to formulate a rule of con-
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context the Chadha decision does exceed in its generality anything the Court has done in its history, including its historic decision in the "Steel Seizure" case. 5
However, a closer scrutiny of the majority opinion in
Chadha, read in the context of the concurring opinion and the
two dissents, leads one to conclude that, hopefully, Chadha's
importance may have been greatly exaggerated by some and
that its effect may well be limited not only by a legislature more
cautious in delegating its powers in the future 6, but also by the
Court itself, depending on its desire to do so. 7 An indication in
that positive direction is not apparent at this date. 8
In the final analysis, if the Constitution has endured for over
two hundred years it is in large part due to the essentially pragmatic approach of the American judiciary towards constitutional
interpretation. 9 It is a bit late in the day for the Supreme Court
to become a "strict constructionist"'10 and to revert to a doctrine
stitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it
is to be applied.
Liverpool, N.Y. &Phila. S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33,
39 (1885). See also Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
5. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585-89
(1952).
6. "[A] legislative rule may rest upon an implied or an unclear grant of
power as well as upon an express and clear grant of power." K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE, § 5.03, at 299 (1958). It seems to me that by simply using clear and unambiguous language, Congress can effectively limit
the power delegated to the various agencies.

7. The Court has, on occasion, been willing to retreat from a previous
position. In White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), the
Supreme Court held that vertical territorial and customer restrictions were
not "per se" illegal. Four years later, without reversing White Motor, the
Supreme Court held in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &Co., 388 U.S. 365,

379 (1967), that vertical territorial and customer restraints in re-sale transactions were "per se" illegal. Ten years later, changing directions again, the
Supreme Court in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59
(1977) said, "the appropriate decision is to return to the rule of reason that

governed vertical restrictions prior to Schwinn."
8. See, e.g., Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983), af#ig. Consumer Energy Council of
America v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States Senate v. FTC,
103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983), affg. Consumers Union v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (en banc).
Following the Supreme Court's lead, lower federal courts have followed
suit in other cases involving the legislative veto mechanism. E.g. Mohammed Ali Ghoelian v. I.N.S. slip op. (6th Cir. Sept. 14, 1983); LeBlanc v. I.N.S.,
715 F.2d 685, 688 n.2 (1st Cir. 1983).
9. "Under such circumstances we think it is not forbidden by the Constitution that there be a pragmatic test of matters which even the most expert could not know in advance." Market St. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n.,
324 U.S. 548, 569 (1945).
10. Strict construction of a statute means simply that it must be confined to such subjects or applications as are obviously within its terms
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of separation of powers which, if it is as the Court perceives it, is
nearly two hundred years old.1 ' For this Supreme Court to state
that a theoretical doctrine never immutably incorporated in the
Constitution rules us from the graves of our country's Founders
some two centuries later, after numerous rulings altering the
original document beyond a shape recognizable to its original
signers, is surprising. To proceed, by the stroke of a pen, to impair or destroy the political working apparatus set up by the
twentieth century congress in over two hundred statutes, 12 with
approval of the Executive,' 3 is a bit much to
the consent and the
4
digest.'
peacably
My somewhat pessimistic assessment is that if something is
not done to limit the Chadha decision to the facts in that case, it
may well have a most deleterious effect on modern American
democratic government. It may far exceed any constitutional
damage that the Supreme Court apparently perceived in finding
the offending legislative veto clause, in the Immigration and Nationality Act, unconstitutional merely because Congress tried to
retain a modicum of supervision over the implementation of the
and purposes. (citation omitted) It does not require such an unreasona-

bly technical construction that the words used cannot be given their
fair and sensible meaning in accord with the obvious intent of the
legislature.
City of Elmhurst v. Buettgen, 394 Mll. 248, 253, 68 N.E.2d 278, 283 (1946).
11. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2781. The Court refers to its decision in Buckley v. Valeo:
We have recently noted that '[t Ihe principle of separation of powers
was not simply an abstract generalization in the minds of the Framers:
it was woven into the documents that they drafted in Philadelphia in
the summer of 1787.
103 S. Ct. at 2781, citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976).
12. For a partial list of statutes authorizing congressional oversight, see
Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at CongressionalControl of the Executive, 63 CAL. L. REV. 983, 1089 (1975).
13. Of particular interest, at this time, are the following statutes: "War
Powers Resolution," Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 5(c), 87 Stat. 555, 556-57 (1973)
(where non-statutory hostile actions, may order removal of troops by concurrent resolution of Congress); and "Atomic Weapons and Special Nuclear
Materials Rewards Act" Pub. L. No. 93-377, § 2, 88 Stat. 472, 474 codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2201(v) (1976) (disapprove proposed distribution of nuclear material to foreign nation by concurrent resolution by Congress); and Act of Oct.
26, 1974 to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 93-485, 88 Stat.
1460, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2153(d) (1976) (approval of proposed agreement
for nuclear cooperation unless waived by Joint Committee resolution); and
"Act of Dec. 27, 1974", Pub. L. No. 93-552, § 613, 88 Stat. 1745, 1766 (simple
resolution by either House to disapprove military building project). See
Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2811-16 (White, J., dissenting, Appendix 1) (listing of
statutes with provisions authorizing Congressional review).
14. The Court should never "formulate a rule of constitutional law
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied."
Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Commissioner of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33,
39 (1885).
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law by its delegate, the Attorney General-an arrangement
which had worked for several decades. Time will tell us who is
right.
The purpose of this article is to show how the Supreme
Court itself might want to expressly limit the effect of the
Chadha bombshell. Also, should it not choose to do so, what
Congress can do about retaining some of its power before it is
delegated to an executive branch with an ever growing hunger
5
for concentrated clout.'

II. THE CHADHA DECISION
1. The Facts
The facts in this case are not an aide in making good law.
Mr. Jagdish Rai Chadha is an alien who was admitted in 1966 to
the United States on a student visa and, like so many foreign
students from the Third World, apparently decided to overstay
his legal stay which expired on June 30, 1972; he stayed because
the United States had more appeal and more economic opportunities than the country from which he came. 16 A little over a
year later the law caught up with him, and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service issued a show-cause order on October 11,
1973, as to why he should not be deported. 17 Having applied for
suspension of his deportation, and being lucky enough to appear
before an apparently sympathetic immigration judge, 18 he had
his impending deportation suspended on June 25, 1974, pursuant
to section 244(a) (1) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act. 19
The Attorney General adopted the immigration judge's deci15. See de Seife, The Exhaustion of the Exhaustion of Remedies. Increasing the Powers of the President Under the Guise of AdministrativeLaw
Reform, 14 VAL.U.L. REV. 427 (1980). See also Kaiser, CongressionalAction
to Overturn Agency Rules: Alternatives to the "Legislative Veto," 32 AD. L.

REV. 667 (1980).
16. "Chadha is an East Indian who was born in Kenya and holds a British passport." Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2770.
17. Chadha v. Imigration and Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408, 411 (9th

Cir. 1980).
18. This authority was exercised pursuant to section 11, 5 U.S.C. § 3105
(1982), of the Administrative Procedure Act, which provides for hearing examiners to conduct hearings with agencies. In 1972, by Civil Service Commission promulgation, the title of "hearing examiner" was changed to
"Administrative Law Judge." 37 Fed. Reg. 16,787 (1972). Congress obliquely
approved what was a bold, if essentially unauthorized action (at least by
statute) in 1978. 92 Stat. 183 (1978). In fact, however, the so-called "immigration judges" are not "administrative law judges", but rather special inquiry judges who have neither the independence nor the status of A.P.A.
administrative law judges. 66 Stat. 209, § 242(b) (1952), 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)

(1982); 8 C.F.R. § 242.8 (1983).

19. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1982).
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sion 20 and reported the order suspending the deportation to
Congress as required by section 244(c) (1).21
The Supreme Court's majority opinion in Chadha points out
that, absent congressional action, Chadha's deportation proceedings would have been cancelled the day after December 19,
1975, the last day on which Congress could exercise the veto authority reserved to it under section 244(c) (2), and his status
would have been adjusted to that of a permanent resident
alien. 22 It was not until December 12, 1975, one week before the
last day on which Congress could act, that the Chairman of the
Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration and Citizenship and
International Law introduced a resolution vetoing "the granting
of permanent residence in the United States to [six] aliens, including Chadha. '' 23 The House Committee on the Judiciary discharged the resolution from further discussion and forwarded it
to the House of Representatives for a vote on December 16,
1975.24 The resolution was passed.
Therefore, a year and a half after the Attorney General's Report was submitted, the House of Representatives by virtue of
section 244(c) (2) passed a resolution vetoing the suspension of
Chadha's deportation order,25 after which the immigration judge
had no choice but to reopen the deportation proceedings. At
that hearing, Chadha attacked the constitutionality of the section of the statute26 giving Congress the right to overview the
Attorney General's action, 27 an argument that the immigration
judge felt, correctly, unqualified to pass upon. On November 8,
1976, the judge ordered Chadha's deportation. Chadha then appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals which similarly disPursuant to the provisions of 8 C.F.R. §§ 242.2, 103.5 (1983).
8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(1) (1982).
See, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(d) (1982).
Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2771, the court refers to H.R. Res. 926, 94th
1st Sess.; 121 Cong. Rec. 40,247 (1975).
24. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2771. The court refers to 121 Cong. Rec. 40,800.
25. The House passed the resolution without any debate or recorded
vote. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2771.
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (2) (1982).
20.
21.
22.
23.
Cong.,

27. (2) In the case of an alien specified in paragraph (1) of subsection
(a) of this section-if during the session of the Congress at which a
case is reported, or prior to the close of the session of the Congress next
following the session at which a case is reported, either the Senate or
the House of Representatives passes a resolution stating in substance
that it does not favor the suspension of such deportation, the Attorney
General shall thereupon deport such alien or authorize the alien's voluntary departure at his own expense under the order of deportation in

the manner provided by law. If, within the time specified, neither the
Senate nor the House of Representatives shall pass such a resolution,
the Attorney General shall cancel deportation proceedings.

8 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (2) (1982).
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missed his argument. He then filed for a review of the
deportation order with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. 28 He was joined by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service 29 in his argument that section 244(c) (2) was unconstitutional. The Court then requested amici curiae briefs from both
the House of Representatives and the Senate. Chadha won in
the Court of Appeals 30 on December 22, 1980, nearly three years
later. Motions for rehearing and rehearing en banc were denied
on March 25, 1981. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court
by the Department of Justice primarily to decide this issue once
and for all.3 1 The Supreme Court, not unexpectedly one feels,
granted certiorari. Then, after hearing arguments in the October 1981 Term, the Court ordered reargument during the 1983
term-an unusual departure from normal procedure. 32 The
Court finally announced its decision on June 13, 1983, eleven
years after Chadha's presence in the United States had become
illegal and seventeen years after his entry.
2. The Main Issue
The main issue under consideration here, as stated by the
Chief Justice,33 is whether section 244(c) (2) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 34 which authorizes one house of Congress
to invalidate, by resolution, the decision of the Executive
Branch (acting pursuant to authority delegated by Congress to
the Attorney General of the United States) allowing a particular
deportable alien to remain in the United States, is constitu28. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (5) (1982).
29. Chadha, 634 F.2d at 411.
30. Id. at 408-36.
31. The Court of Appeals requested amici curiae briefs from both the
House of Representatives and the Senate, basing this request on Cheng
Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206, 210 n. 9 (1968), and Atkins v. United States,
556 F.2d 1028, 1058 (dt. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978). Chadha,
634 F.2d at 411. Not content with the outcome in the Ninth Circuit which
vindicated its position, the Department of Justice, an arm of the Executive
Branch, undoubtedly felt that tactically the time had come to bring this test
before a Supreme Court more closely in tune with the Executive's position
in the long tug-of-war with Congress over the finality of the power delegated
by Congress in immigration cases. The sweep of the Supreme Court's majority opinion would appear to be an unexpected bonus for the Executive in
other areas of its activities as well.
32. Cert. granted in Nos. 80-2170 and 80-2171 House of Rep. v. Chadha
and Congress v. Chadha. Reargument ordered, 102 S. Ct. 3507 (1982) (Bren-

nan, J. and Blackmun, Jr. dissenting).
33. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2769-70. The Court disposes, rather cavalierly,
of seven sub-issues not directly relevant to the discussion in this article.
34. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (2) (1982).
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tional? 35 (i.e. does the legislative veto conform to the intent of
the Founding Fathers to maintain the separation of powers envisaged by the Constitution?)
Responding in the negative, the majority opinion, delivered
by the Chief Justice, in which Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, Stevens and O'Connor joined, affirmed the lower
court's decision. 36 Justice Powell filed an opinion concurring in
the judgment, but not in the majority's rationale. 3 7 Justice
White filed a dissenting opinion 38 and Justice Rehnquist ified
39
his own dissenting opinion in which Justice White joined.
4. The Court's Decision-MainIssue
A.

Majority

As was noted on the main issue being discussed here, the
Court held that the congressional veto provision in section
24(c) (2) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act was unconstitutional since it constituted legislation which did not follow
the constitutional mandate of the presentation clause.
The rationale for the majority opinion is as follows:
1. Article I, section 140 of the Constitution requires that all
legislative powers be vested in a Congress consisting of a Senate
and a House of Representatives, and section 7 requires that
every bill passed by the House and the Senate, before becoming
law, be presented to the President, and if it is vetoed, to be repassed by two-thirds of the Senate and House. 4 1 This repre35. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2769-70. The Court's language itself in framing
this issue indicates the quasi-judicial nature of the Attorney General's action under the Statute.
36. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2788. This is a most interesting majority: one
might speculate that Justice Marshall, Blackmun and Brennan agreed in
the result but it is surprising to find them silent on the official rationale. In
other situations the majority might well have consisted of a 3-2-1-1 plurality
(the Chief Justice and Justice Stevens and O'Connor, Justice Brennan and
Blackmun, Justice Marshall and Justice Powell).
37. Id. at 2788-92 (Powell, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 2792-2816 (White, J., dissenting).

39. Id. at 2816-17 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
40. "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress
of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." U.S. CONST., art. I, § 1.

41. Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives
and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the
President of the United States.
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7, cl. 2.

Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the
Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a
question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the
United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved
by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of
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sents the Framer's decision that the legislative power of the
federal government should be exercised in accord with a very
precise procedure which is an integral part of the constitutional
design for the separation of powers. 42
2. The action taken by the House pursuant to section

43
244(c) (2) was essentially legislative in purpose and effect. It

was thus subject to the procedural requirements of article I, section 7 for legislative action: Passage by a majority of both

houses and presentation to the President. The one house veto
operates to overrule the attorney general and mandates
Chadha's deportation. The veto's legislative character is confirmed by the character of the congressional action it supplants;
i.e., absent the veto provision of section 244(c) (2), neither the
House nor the Senate, or both acting together, could effectively
require the Attorney General to deport an alien once the Attorney General, in the exercise of legislatively delegated authority,
had determined that the alien should remain in the United
States. Without a veto provision, this could have been achieved
only by legislation requiring deportation. 44 A veto by one house
under section 244(c) (2) cannot be justified as an attempt at
amending the standards set out in section 244(a) (1), or as a repeal of section 244 as it applies to Chadha.
The nature of the decision implemented by the one house
veto further manifests its legislative character. Congress must
abide by its delegation of authority to the Attorney General until that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked.4 5 In addition, the veto's legislative character is confirmed by the fact that
when the Framers intended to authorize either house of Congress to act alone and outside of its prescribed bicameral legislative role, they narrowly and precisely defined the procedure for
such action under the Constitution. 46
B.

The Concurring Opinion

Justice Powell concurred in the result, but would not have
reached the issues decided by the majority. Justice Powell
the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and

Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
42. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976).
43. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2784; the Court refers to S. Rep. No. 1335, 54th
Cong., 2nd Sess., 8 (1897).
44. This is highly debatable as having all the earmarks of a "bill of
attainder."
U.S. CONST.,

45. Javits and Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto:

A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 455, 461-62 (1977).
46. See, U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 6; art. I, § 3, cl. 5; art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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would have decided the case on a narrower ground, namely,
when Congress finds that a particular person "does not satisfy
the statutory criteria for permanent residence in this country it
has assumed a judicial function in violation of the principle of
separation of powers. '47 Having reached that decision, Justice
Powell would not go on to determine the "broader question
whether legislative vetoes are invalid under the presentment
clauses.

'48

Justice Powell's decision, while reaching the same result as
the majority, would have spared a lot of commentator's ink and
would not have assumed the monstrous proportions attributed
to the majority opinion by Justice White. 49 Justice Powell demonstrates again that he is not only an outstanding legal draftsman, but that his opinions reflect quality legal thought with
solid scholarly underpinnings, and are in the historic tradition of
the Supreme Court's decision-making in cases involving constitutional issues 5° -a tradition that the majority opinion in
Chadha may well have shattered.
C. The Dissents
1. Justice White's dissenting opinion bemoans the fact that
the majority decision, in addition to invalidating section
244(c) (2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, also "sounds
the death knell for nearly two hundred other statutory provisions in which Congress has reserved a 'legislative veto.' "51 He
then agrees that the court should have followed the Powell decision, in basing its decision on the narrower ground of separation
of powers and not reaching the other issues. Of particular and
vital concern today is the constitional validity of the congressional power of review in matters involving legislative delegations under the War Powers Act 52 and various agency
47. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2789 (Powell, J., concurring).
48. Id. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
49. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2792-2816, (White, J., dissenting). This case
should provide fodder for a whole generation of young law faculty members
writing law review articles under the gun of the "publish or perish" rule.
50. See Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of
CongressionalPower, 68 VA. L. REV. 253, 253-56 (1982).
51. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2792.
52. War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (1976). It would be interesting to apply the Chadha decision to the War Powers Resolution, which was
enacted over a presidential veto and which has not been seriously challenged by the former or present occupants of the White House. To what
extent would the events of Lebanon not be subject to congressional review
and when is war "War", and what about international "police action"? Are
these expeditions really within the unchecked constitutional province of
the executive? Where in the Constitution does this executive power to engage American forces abroad exist? Congress, by no stretch of the imagina-
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rulemaking acts as they apply to independent agencies. 53
Justice White's dissent is also based on the pragmatic idea
that the legislative veto has, over the last fifty years, become one
of the major means by which Congress retains and insures the
accountability of executive and independent agencies to which
it delegates some of its powers. And, as he states, "without a
legislative veto Congress is faced with a Hobson's choice: either
to refrain from delegating the necessary authority, leaving itself
with the hopeless task of writing laws with the requisite specificity to cover endless special circumstances across the entire policy landscape, or in the alternative, to abdicate its lawmaking
function to the executive branch and independent agencies," 54 a
role that obviously under our Constitution cannot be chosen by
the legislative branch of the government. The dissent ends with
a statement that:
even more I regret the destructive scope of the Court's holding. It
reflects a profoundly different conception of the Constitution than
that held by the Courts which sanctioned the modern administrative state. Today's decision strikes down in one fell swoop provisions and more laws enacted by Congress than the court has
cumulatively invalidated in its history. I fear it will now be more
difficult to insure that the fundamental policy decisions in our society will be made not by an appointed
official but by the body imme55
diately responsible to the people.
2. Justice Rehnquist's dissent is based on the fact that section 244(c) (2) cannot be severed from the rest of the statute
under the severability clause. His argument is that this section
is severable only if Congress would have intended to permit the
Attorney General to suspend deportations without it. The legislative history of section 244, according to Justice Rehnquist,
makes it obvious that the Congress was unwilling to give the executive branch permission to suspend deportation on its own.
Over the years, Congress consistently rejected requests from
the executive for complete discretion in this area. Congress always insisted on retaining ultimate control, whether by concurrent resolution, as in the 1958 Act, 5 6 or by one house veto as in
the present Act. Congress has never indicated that it would be
tion, can delegate its "war" powers to the Executive; so where does that

leave us? All these troubling questions will lead to confrontation between
the co-equal branches of our government instead of providing a co-ordinated effort to work for a common goal if the reach of the Chadha decision
is not checked.
53. E.g., Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Acts of 1974,
31 U.S.C. § 1403 (1976).
54. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2793.
55. Id. at 2810-1i, quoting, Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).

56. Act of July 1,1948, ch. 783, 62 Stat. 1206 (1948).
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willing to permit suspensions of deportation unless it could re57
tain some sort of veto.

III. A

PRIMER OF ADMINISTRATIVE/CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW
CONCEPTS

A.

Some Basic Definitions-PlainLanguage Meaning
FacilitatesCorrect Legal Analysis

The permanence of the American constitutional system is
largely due to the fact that the Supreme Court has, over the
years, injected meaning into language that otherwise would
have been rapidly dated. A "strict" construction might render
unacceptable the document by which the people of the United
States created its system of government in times that were radically different from today's "Star Wars".58 This flexibility is different from changing the plain meaning of words and the
contemporaneous concepts they express.
The time may have come to critically challenge the
Supreme Court's propensity to use words loosely in order to fit
its conclusions and periodically modify the theories underlying
the power of Congress to delegate its authority. This challenge
is particularly appropriate when the balance of power envisaged
by the Framers of the Constitution is consistently tilted in favor
of one branch of government.
It seems to me that it is about time to clean up our thinking
by cleaning up our language: words do have a specific meaning,
and it is not necessarily the meaning dictated by changed
conditions.
57. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2817. In a speech before the American Bar Association, Justice Rehnquist stated: "I subscribe, unreservedly to the notion that this particular type of provision [legislative veto I is a violation of
the constitutional principles of the separation of powers." Address by Justice Rehnquist, American Bar Association Section on Administrative Law
in Dallas, Texas (August 12, 1969). This, of course, was written while he was
heading the Office of Legal Counsel and not yet on the Supreme Court.
(Justice Rehnquist was confirmed by the Senate on December 10, 1971).
58. For example, in construing the Separation of Powers doctrine
Professors Frankfurter and Landis have noted that:
As a principle of statesmanship the practical demands of government
preclude its [the Separation of Powers doctrine] doctrinaire application ....
[It is] a "political doctrine," and not a technical rule of law.
Nor has it been treated by the Supreme Court as a technical legal doctrine. From the beginning that Court has refused to draw abstract, analytical lines of separation and has recognized necessary areas of
interaction.
Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A study in Separation of Powers, 37
HARv.L. REV. 1010, 1012-14 (1924).
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For instance, the mere fact that the Supreme Court in
Chadha says that the decision by the Attorney General is legislative in nature, and that it therefore takes legislation to overturn it, does not necessarily make it so, any more than declaring
that "day" is "night" or "may" means "shall."
Let us look at six words and their basic definitions and look
at the implications if the courts were to use more frequently and
consistently, the plain language rule in statutory construction.
1. Legislation, in the common understanding of the word,
is an action by a body of individuals possessing the power to
enforce it, which affects a large number of people that fall within
certain predetermined classifications. It is both broad in scope
and perspective: 59 i.e., rules apply to the conduct of a broad
spectrum of individuals.
2. Adjudication is a decision by an impartial institution,
empowered to do so, which involves a relatively small number of
people within a very narrow classification and may well be, and
often is retroactive in its effect: 60 i.e. the application of a rule to
particulatized situations involves adjudication.
3. "Independent" v. "Executive Agencies"
It is elementary to remember that so-called "independent"
agencies are creatures of Congress, 6 1 whereas the executive
agencies are properly under the direct control of the
62
Executive.
59. "'Legislative power,' as distinguished from 'executive power,' is authority to make laws, but not to enforce them or appoint agents charged
with duty of such enforcement. The latter are executive functions." Munic-

ipality of St. Thomas & St. John v. Gordon, 78 F. Supp. 440, 443 (D. V.I. 1948).
60. "Legislative power" prescribes rules of action while "judicial power"
determines whether such rules have been transgressed by ascertaining existing facts. In re Manufacturer's Frieght Forwarding Co., 294 Mich. 57, 59,

292 N.W. 678, 680 (1940). "Legislative power is the power to enact laws or to

declare what the law shall be. [citation omitted] Judicial power is the
power which adjudicates upon the rights of citizens, and to that end construes and applies the law." Mitchell v. Lowden, 288 Ill. 327, 341, 123 N.E.
566, 572 (1919), overruled, Stofer v. Motor Vehicle Casualty Co., 68 Ill. 2d 361,
369 N.E.2d 875 (1977).
61. "Only two Executive Branch offices, therefore, [the Presidency and
Vice Presidency] are creatures of the Constitution; all other departments
and agencies, from the State Department to the General Services Administration, are creatures of the Congress and owe their very existence to the
Legislative Branch." Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S.
425, 508 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).

62. That is why a reorganization of executive agencies by the President
should not and probably cannot, constitutionally, include the reorganization of independent agencies unless such power is delegated by the
Congress.
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'63
4. "Privatelegislation" v. "public legislation

Historically, Congress has passed private laws,6 4 the constitutionality of which has, on occasion, been tested.65 "Public"
legislation can be distinguished from adjudication if one looks at
the prospective effect test. 66 How one can distinguish "private"
legislation from adjudication, if the former's reach is retroactive,
is difficult to comprehend, 67 except in the semantic "Alice in
Wonderland" atmosphere in which our judicial system some68
times operates.
Legislative action which affects an individual, particularly in
the area of criminal law, would be a bill of attainder which is per
se unconstitutional. It might thus be argued that the exclusion
of an individual from American soil is quasi-criminal in its effect
and, therefore, the legislative veto in the Immigration and Naturalization Act is tantamount to a bill of attainder.
While it may be somewhat simplistic, it is generally correct
to state that when Congress creates an agency, it delegates to it
legislative power ("rulemaking" with which are intertwined the
other two powers provided for under our constitutional scheme,
namely, the adjudicatory and executive powers) to implement
legislation by "filling in the details" through the rulemaking device and seeing to it that the law is executed in accordance with
the congressional mandate. It would seem obvious that while
the Attorney General has been delegated "legislative" authority
by the Congress to issue rules in connection with the Immigration and Naturalization Act, the application of these particular
rules to any individual comes within his implied "adjudicatory"
powers. This is why hearings are involved in each individual
case, as was the case with Chadha. It could therefore be just as
easily and more cogently argued that to deprive Chadha of the
adjudicatory process, at that stage, would have amounted to an
unconstitutional denial under the due process clause.
63. Note, Private Bills in Congress, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1684 (1966).

64. Id. at 1685-86.
65. Id. at 1684-88.
66. See supra note 60.
67. Note, supra note 63, at 1686-88.
68. See, e.g., Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, reh'g denied, 329
U.S. 830 (1946) (where the Supreme Court interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 398, which
provided that it was an offense to transport any woman in interstate commerce "for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose," to include the practice of polygamy engaged in by
Mormons. Clearly, Congress did not intend this statute to include polygamy when it enacted the law).
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Either way, Chadha should be limited in its application to
the facts in Chadha, or in similar cases involving similar statutory provision and procedures.
B.

The Separation of Powers Doctrine

The imprints of French thinkers on the American Framers
of the Constitution is undeniable 69 and would indicate that, contrary to the majority of current American thinking, the Founders, e.g., Jefferson, Franklin, were quite Gallic in their
approach to legislative drafting. Gallic thought favors having a
few rules which can then be interpreted in a flexible manner to
adjust to situations as they occur, rather than to have inflexible
rules which get to be more and more difficult to implement be70
cause of changes in conditions.
There are aspects of the separation of powers doctrine
which have been scrupulously maintained since the very begin71
ning of constitutional interpretation.
On the one hand, the most prudent approach is to state that
Congress cannot constitutionally interfere in the adjudicatory
and executive aspects of either the independent or the executive agencies' powers, except by the indirect use of the power of
the purse. 72 On the other hand, if Congress is to function with a
modicum of efficiency and economy, can it be prohibited from
73
retaining the reins on the legislative fancy of these agencies,
including the executive agencies?
69. "The men who were responsible for framing our Constitution were
influenced by eighteenth century liberal thought from both French and

English sources. French influences, more philosophical than legal in character, were particularly strong with Franklin, who took a significant part in
framing the treason clause." Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 15 n. 21
(1945).
70. This diversity in conceptual approach is visible in the drafting, for
instance, of modern contracts. There is no doubt that a contract written by
a French lawyer is substantially shorter than a contract written by an
American lawyer simply because the French lawyer feels that one cannot
take care of all contingencies in a legal document and one must rely on
common sense and good faith, something which is notably absent from the

conceptual approach of the American lawyer who feels that every contingency, no matter how remote, must be covered. This explains to a great
extent the volume of work created by American legal thinking as opposed
to that of its civil law counterparts, particularly the French; this often is

what produces some problems in international and multi-national negotiations and agreements.
71. See, e.g., Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. 408 (1792); de Seife, supra note 15.

72. "The ultimate weapon of enforcement available to the Congress
would, of course, be the 'power of the purse.'" United States v. Richardson,
418 U.S. 166, 178 n.11 (1974).
73. See Note, Congressional Veto of Administrative Action: The Prob-

able Response to a Constitutional Challenge, 1976 DuKE L.J. 285, 288-89.
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It is doubtful that the branches of government were ever
meant to be totally adversarial in nature and mutually exclusive. 74 The business of government is essentially a partnership.
Government could not function if none of the actions of the Executive could have a quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative flavor on
occasion, or where judicial decisions could not, at times, have an
executive or administrative aspect, as well as some legislative
flavor.75 By the same token even Congress has traditionally
been allowed to dabble in quasi-judicial and quasi-executive activities. 76 The basic issue in the latter area of activity being, apparently, whether the action involved makes the Representative
States," in which case a conor Senator an "Officer of the United
77
stitutional obstacle is reached.
A minimum amount of interference is necessary between
the three branches, 78 regardless of theory. This is indispensible
if the system is to function properly over long periods of time
without resulting in revolution. 79 To postulate otherwise would
provide no rationale supporting the court ordered busing of
school children (a legislative function) and the overseeing of the
implementation of such busing rules (an executive function).
Similarly, there would be no way to allow the executive to send
American troops overseas in the absence of a formal declaration
of war by Congress. The Chadha court apparently wants to
have its cake and eat it too.
Does the separation of powers doctrine mandate that Congress can in no way interfere with another branch in the exercise of whatever its powers may be, and that the broad lines of
jurisdiction cannot be, on occasion, crossed? Stated another
way, that the legislative powers of Congress cannot be interfered with by the executive powers, and the judicial power cannot be interfered with by the legislative or executive powers?
74. "It seems, as historians have noted, that Americans in 1776 gave only
a verbal recognition to the concept of separation of powers in their Revolu-

tionary constitutions, since they were apparently not concerned with a real

division of department functions." WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 1776-1787, 153-54 (1969).
75. E.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
76. de Seife, supra note 15, at 433-34.
77. Strictly speaking, a person in the service of the government is not an

officer of the United States unless he holds his place by virtue of the appointment of the President, or by one of the courts of justice, or by the head
of the department authorized to make such appointment. United States v.
Mouat, 124 U.S. 303 (1888).
78. See Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union of Am., N. Dakota Division v.
WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

79. "I hold it, that a little rebellion, now and then, is a good thing, and as
necessary in the political world as storms in the physical." Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Jan. 30, 1787).
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Could it not then be assumed that for any branch to maintain a
line of control within its own power spectrum (even though part
of that power has been delegated to another branch) might not
be inconsistent with a proper interpretation of the separation of
powers?
If the first proposition reflects the logic of the Chadha majority, then it is an approach best implemented by the Powell
concurring opinion which prudently and correctly avoids the il80
logical sweep of the majority opinion.
A flexible approach to the constitutional separation of powers is not a device invented by pragmatists and result-oriented
scholars of the latter half of this century. Rather it has its roots
intertwined with those of the Constitution itself.81 Therefore,
those who argue that the flexible approach is what permeated
the thinking of the Founders of this great Constitution are indeed heirs to an old, established and constitutional, indeed more
82
correctly contemporaneous, thinking.
The Supreme Court in Chadha is saying that even when the
Executive agrees to submit some in futuro executive decision,
made in furtherance of a legislative delegation, to partial or full
congressional approval, that such a legislative delegation is unconstitutional. This is a highly questionable interpretation of
the separation of powers doctrine. Supreme Court decisions,
more closely contemporaneous to the framing of the constitution, ought to carry more weight than strained constructions of
the Courts, some 200 years later, trying to create a philosophy of
literal construction which in all likelihood did not originally exist. It is not too much to say that Chadha is one case where a
literal "modern" interpretation of language, not meant to be
taken literally, does not represent the best approach to constitu83
tional interpretation.
80. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2788 (Powell, J., concurring).
81. See Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. 378 (1798).
82. My own thinking in that area has radically changed from some 25

years ago, when I favored division of powers within administrative agencies. I now feel very much opposed to this decision, seeing the wisdom of
the pioneers of administrative law who correctly felt that the three powers-legislative, executive, and judicial--could very well be vested in the
same body, provided that there is some kind of reviewing mechanism to
insure equity and justice at the end of the process.
83. Other concepts, such as immunity, are not constitutional concepts

and are not contemporaneous with the constitution. In fact, immunity as

imposed by the Supreme Court is a relatively recent creation, dating back
to 1838. President Reagan may consider it a virtue to be literal in the construction of constitutional provisions, but his enthusiasm applies only insofar as it does not affect the Executive branch, e.g. the War Powers Act,
codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1976).
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The problem with many of these fine distinctions is that in
hoeing too close a line to a literal and doctrinaire interpretation
of the separation of powers doctrine, we obtain results which
were probably not intended by the Framers. The judicial gloss
on the written Constitution if viewed in too orthodox a fashion,
would soon reach unworkable situations: a result surely not intended by the Founding Fathers who were pragmatists and
realists.

84

It ill behooves the Court to come up with dogmatic declarations as to the tenets of the separation of powers doctrine when,
85
in other decisions, it has been more than cavalier in this area.
If it is impermissible under our present Constitution for the
branches of government to arrive at a reasonable, cooperative
theme, then this leads considerable impetus to those who claim
that our form of government is dated and that the parliamentary
form is to be preferred in this day and age 86 if we are to preserve
democracy.
C.

Delegation of Powers Doctrines

If it is accepted that legislators may delegate their legislative power, 87 the delegation is limited to the extent of rulemak-

ing by the agency, an activity which is really an extension of the
legislative process. 88
84. "The Constitution reflect [s] a more pragmatic view of governmenta view that each branch of government [will] ultimately seek to attain for
itself complete control over the exercise of political power." Comment, CongressionalOversight of Administrative Discretion: Defining the ProperRole
of the Legislative Veto, 26 Am.U. L. REV. 1018, 1024 (1977).
85. A notorious example is Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Services, 433
U.S. 425, 443 (1977), where the majority stated: "(T]he Court [in U.S. v.
Nixon] squarely rejected the argument that the Constitution contemplates
a complete division of authority between the three branches .... [W]e
therefore find that appellants argument rests upon an 'archaic' view of the
separation of powers as requiring three outright departments of government.'" 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1971), quoting Nixon v. Administrator of Gen.
Services, 408 F. Supp. 321, 342 (D.D.C. 1976). See also, Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 512-18 (1969) (Court's decision on House refusal to seat
Congressman does not violate this principle).
86. See generally Cutler, Presidentvs. Congress: Does the Separation of
Powers Still Work?, 47 Am.ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (1980). In fact, Loyd Cut-

ler's ideas seem to favor the adoption of the French Model of the 5th Republic, the present system of French government.
87. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944) (delegation of legislative power permissible under Constitution); Amalgamated Meat Cutters &
Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 745 (D.D.C. 1971) (every
delegation of legislative power not forbidden by Constitution).
88. Bolton, The Legislative Veto, Unseparating the Powers, 148 AEI
STuDiEs 5-8 (Wash. D.C., 1977).
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Under the non-delegation doctrine, 89 which has only been
used in two instances by the Supreme Court, legislators may not
delegate their legislative power. This is basically a historical notion in federal administrative law which occasionally makes
noises as if it were ready to awaken from its American common
law hibernation. 90
It should be remembered that, early on, the Supreme Court
abandoned the non-delegation of powers doctrine to strike down
the delegation of quasi-legislative powers to the President by
Congress. It was then held that the delegatee of such congressional legislative powers had to work within the structures of a
well-defined set of guidelines, the so-called "standards for administrative guidance." This in turn has been fairly well circumscribed. Also, at present, administrative law theory seems to be
that, in exchange for a greater amount of court supervision of
agency decisions, uncontrolled and practically unlimited congressional delegations are acceptable in the federal system. 91
The "precise standard for administrative guidance" referred
to above, another concept abandoned by the Supreme Court a
number of years ago, further dilutes any pretense of reverting to
a "strict construction" of the separation of powers doctrine
92
under the Constitution.
It is questionable whether a return to the "good old" days of
the non-delegation doctrine, or even that of the "precise guidelines for administration discretion, ' 93 is possible or even desirable. This may well constitute a return to simpler times but does
not necessarily offer a solution to the contemporary problems of
a post-industrial society.
Why is it constitutionally untenable to argue that Congress
is at least as capable of defining the laws it promulgates as the
other branches of government? The fact that the Constitution
89. "That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is
a principal universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance
of the system of government ordained by the Constitution." Field v. Clark,
143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
90. Bolton, supra note 88, at 6-7. On the state level, however, the delegation doctrine functions in several jurisdictions.
91. Bolton, supra note 88, at 39-43. The importance of just results proba-

bly transgresses any of the importance now given to procedural due process. For the Constitution to survive as a viable legal document, it would
seem that it is more important for the judicial system to function in further-

ance of a constitutional scheme that is responsive to the needs of our society at particular times in its history.
92. Since the abandonment of that doctrine which had controlled ad-

ministrative law up to the sixties, see, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), it seems that the new emphasis is Court review
of administrative action. See E.P.A. v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).

93. See supra note 92.
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did not provide for such an interpretation is not a convincing
argument since the Constitution did not provide for a lot of
94
things which are now taken for granted.
It is interesting to speculate why this Supreme Court feels
that' in the tri-partite constitutional system so laboriously devised by the Founding Fathers, Congress is the only one that
seems to be able to constitutionally delegate its legislative function to the other two branches and appears unable to retain any
direct oversight. 95
When Congress adopts a bill which becomes law, after having passed both houses and having been signed by the President, this law is then in need of interpretation and elaboration
by rulemaking. This is one of the functions of the agency to
which this legislative power was delegated. The agency, in its
executive function, implements and enforces the law. It operates in a quasi-judicial capacity when it decides whether an individual has violated the law it is executing or the rules it has
promulgated in its legislative role. If Congress, or an oversight
committee, were to intervene in the "legislative" process, is this
not a process in which Congress has a peculiar right to intervene
in "explaining" that the law which was passed meant X and not
Y as this particular regulation provides? Why should Congress
have to create a "new" law in a presentment clause to "explain"
a law it has passed?96 It is hard to rationalize, from a common
sense viewpoint, that Congress, in its law-making function, cannot intervene after the law takes effect in order to ascertain that
the agency, to which it delegated the lawmaking power by
97
rulemaking, conforms with its initial desires.
94. Some good examples of this idea are the application of some of the
amendments to state action, the extension of the 14th amendment to state
laws or the extension of the commerce clause to matters that would have

remained intrastate transactions otherwise.
The judicial branch has always been influenced by pressure, e.g. the
Roosevelt era. It always knows when not to unduly threaten the powers of

the other branches. For an interesting comment on what makes the courts
tick see NEELY, How COURTS GOVERN AMERICA (1981).
95. For example, the Supreme Court retained direct oversight in Swann
v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), a school busing case.
96. Javits and Klein, supra note 45, at 460-61.
97. See Martin,supra note 50, at 287-88. It will be interesting to watch
the Supreme Court chip away at the Mink decision, E.P.A. v. Mink, 410 U.S.
73 (1973), in future decisions that adopt a pro-executive prejudice against

the Freedom of Information Act. These decisions would likely be in conformance with the philosophy espoused by the Seventh Circuit in some recent cases in which the congressional FOIA mandate for openness has been
severely restricted due to the narrow construction given it by the executive
branch. See, e.g., Stein v. Department of Justice, 662 F.2d 1245 (7th Cir.

1981).
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Surely when Congress creates an "independent agency" to
act on its behalf it may, or should, be able to attach strings to the
delegation of its legislative power.98 The independent agency
then, in its rulemaking, merely extends the legislative function
of Congress, refines it or "fills in the details" as it were. 99 Congress has a legitimate right of oversight to make certain that its
creature, the agency, implements its organic legislation as it
should be implemented and in the spirit in which it was
adopted. 100
We enter into a somewhat murkier area when the delegation is to the executive branch of the government. 10 1 Could it
not be said that (if we accept the fact that the executive is to
execute laws adopted by Congress but that, in pursuing this activity, there are certain actions which have a judicial or legislative flavor) the executive is "entrusted" by the legislature to
parameters of congres"legislate" by rulemaking within the
10 2
sional intent as mandated by law?
Does the Supreme Court in Chadha mean that once Congress has delegated its lawmaking function to an agency, it cannot recapture it or cannot direct it in the correct channel except
by going through the cumbersome "law making" process mandated by the Constitution?x°3 It would not be proper for Congress to abandon for all time any of its powers; it can do so only
on a transitory basis. x°4 I would think that in the area of lawmaking, Congress can retain, and properly so, a measure of veto
power to make certain that rulemaking is in consonnance with
98. See de Seife, supra note 15, at 456. See also, Martin, supra note 50, at

289.

99. Such detail at [the point where Congress enacts a new statute
creating a new agency], before adequate knowledge has been gained,
may prove counterproductive. Moreover, a specialized agency, more efficiently than Congress, can amass the detailed factual data and undertake the reflective professional thought necessary for intelligent
regulation.
Martin, supra note 50, at 289.
100. "Methods such as reporting requirements and congressional committee investigations allow Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated
lawmaking authority, but they do not permit Congress to retain any part of
that authority once it has been delegated." Javits &Klein, supra note 45, at
461-62.
101. See Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 HARv. L REV. 569, 597 (1953).
102. Davis, supra note 6, at 292-94 § 5.01.
103. Martin, supra note 50, at 289.
104. See Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
(statute regulating poultry declared unconstitutional because it resulted in
an excessive delegation of powers to the executive and failed to provide

adequate standards for its application).
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its legislative intent. 105 After all, who knows better what Congress intended than Congress itself?
It would seem to me that "rulemaking" can be overridden
by Congress, particularly if both houses participate in this action. 0 6 In addition, a plausible case can be made for Congress
to delegate this particular review power to one of its houses or
even one of their committees. 10 7 If Congress can delegate legislative powers to an "independent" agency then, surely, it ought
to be able to delegate a portion of those powers to one of its own
committees. 10 8 I am therefore not presently inclined to side
with those who argue in favor of finding that the legislative veto,
when applied to rulemaking, would fall by the wayside because
of unconstitutionality if this power is exercised by a committee
of Congress. 10 9
As stated earlier, it is difficult to understand the rationale by
which the court holds that Congress, or a congressional committee, would have less authority to interpret its own laws than do
the other branches of government to whom Congress' authority
might be delegated by Congress.
D. Conclusion
Congress delegated to the Attorney General certain portions of its legislative power to implement its desiderata as
spelled out in the Immigration and Naturalization Act. Properly, the Attorney General promulgated rules to accomplish the
assigned task-rulemaking, or, in other words, using his quasilegislative power as Congress' delegatee. In his executive capacity, through the Immigration and Naturalization Service, he
proceeded to enforce the law. Mr. Chadha got caught in a conflict with the law and the rules issued pursuant to it by the Attorney General. To determine whether Chadha came within
certain exceptions which would permit him to remain in this
country involved the adjudicatory side of the Attorney General's
job. Mr. Chadha then had a hearing before an examining magistrate who recommended to his delegator, the Attorney General
on what to do. The Attorney General then followed the
recommendation.
105. de Seife, supra note 15, at 459-60.
106. "The division of the Congress into two distinctive bodies assures
that the legislative power would be exercised only after opportunity for full
study and debate in separate settings." Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2784.
107. Henry, The Legislative Veto: In Search of ConstitutionalLimits, 16
HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 735, 736 (1979).
108. de Seife, supra note 15, at 458-60.
109. Cooper &Cooper, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution, 30 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 467, 473-79 (1962).
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If we look at adjudication in its proper context, it seems obvious that the Chadha decision by the Attorney General in10
volved not his "rulemaking" but his "adjudicatory" capacity.
At this point of our discussion it is not necessary to distinguish
between limiting congressional delegation of power to an "executive" agency against an "independent" agency." '
If I am correct that the Attorney General's decision not to
deport Chadha constituted an exercise of the adjudicatory function within his discretion, then the concurring opinion of Justice
Powell is the one that best states the law." 2 We are talking
about interference by the legislative branch of the government
with what is essentially an adjudicatory process." 3 A finding of
legislative overreaching is therefore constitutionally in order.
Maybe it is too simplistic an argument for sophisticated lawyers
to accept; however, it makes sense!

IV. How CHADHA'S IMPACT MAY BE LIMITED
A.

By the Supreme Court

How are we to interpret Chadha and its apparent extensive
effect?
I believe that the effect of Chadha may be circumscribed,
even with its present language, permitting future Supreme
Court interpretations to restrict its effects. This will mean, of
course, a much more careful consideration of denials of certiorari affirming lower courts' decisions that invalidate other legislative veto provisions, where appropriate.11 4 While it is true that
the English language as interpreted by the courts, and particularly the Supreme Court, may mean whatever the court chooses
it to mean at any one time,1 5 this is not a desirable tradition, at
least insofar as those who must construe court decisions are
concerned. 116 It is of course too late now for the Supreme Court
110. "[Aln agency adjudication within meaning of Freedom of Information Act, represents the judicial, rather than legislative function of the
agency; such a proceeding also involves an accusatory or disciplinary element in which individual rights and behavior are put in issue." National
Prison Project of American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Inc. v. Sigler,
390 F. Supp. 789, 791-92 (D. Colo. 1975).
111. de Seife, supra note 15, at 434-35.
112. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2791.

113. See supra note 60.
114. The lower courts have already followed the Chadha decision in several cases. See e.g., Mohammed Aui Chaelian v. I.N.S. slip op. (6th Cir. Sept.
14, 1983); LeBlanc v. INS, 715 F.2d 685 (1st Cir. 1983).
115. See supra note 7. Compare Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896),
with Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

116. ' The doctrine of stare decisis, while perhaps never entirely persuasive on a constitutional question, is a doctrine that demands respect in a
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in Chadha to reverse itself on the rationale, while agreeing on
the result, by espousing Justice Powell's intellectually and infinitely more tenable position.
This is not to say that Justice White's dissent is not persuasive,1 1 7 as is the dissent by Justice Rehnquist.11 8 Rhenquist's argument that the clause under scrutiny was not separable 1 9
from the whole Act is one that deserves careful attention.
Of all the options available to the Court, the one which appeared to be the most prudent was Justice Powell's. His opinion
offered reasoning consonnant with the long established
Supreme Court tradition to not lightly invalidate Congressional
legislation on constitutional grounds and, more importantly, not
to allow such invalidation to reach statutes other than the one
20
involved in the "case and controversy" before the Court.
The Supreme Court could well, in a forthcoming case, indicate that its definition of the word "legislative" in the Chadha
case was conceptually limited to "private legislation" as opposed to "public legislation", and thus confine the effects of legislative vetoes to those situations similar to Chadha. This would
greatly limit the damage which many triumphantly claim is the
virtue of the Chadha decision, something I fail to see.
society governed by the rule of law." Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2487 (1983).
117. See supra note 38.
118. See supra note 39.
119. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 312 (1936); Davis v. Wallace, 257 U.S. 478, 484-85 (1922).
120. "The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader
than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'" Liverpool
N.Y. & Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Emigration Comm'r, 113 U.S. 33 (1885). The
problem with the opinion is that it is strained to an extent where it will snap
if it is not promptly compacted. Many of the distinctions are laborious and
not overwhelmingly logical or even consistent with common sense. It is unfortunately true that hard facts make for bad cases and poor law, and
Chadha is only another example proving this axiom.
The fact that this is a hard case coming from hard facts is underlined by
the majority opinion's incursion into the facts which surrounded the legislative veto in Chadha. Apparently some information provided to the House
by the committee chairman was less than correct and obviously this cast a
negative pall on the proceedings, thus making the majority opinion much
more palatable to those who cherish individual rights. The question, however, is whether the same result could not have been obtained by a less
sweeping decision?
The fact that some of the present Supreme Court justices occasionally
appear to be inclined to favor the executive's extension of powers as against
any congressional retention of delegated powers may be a factor in the unprecedented "sweep" of the Chadha language of the majority opinion.
Such a pro-executive bias has occurred before in our history. We need
only look at the rationale used by the Supreme Court in support of executive action in connection with the internment of our citizens of Japanese
ancestry. See infra note 125.
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Limiting the effect of Chadha is not inconsistent with previous decisions of this Supreme Court.12 1 Thus, the Supreme
Cout recognized that there had to be some flexibility in the actual administrationof government.122 The fact that an agency
should be subordinated to the principle of independence is not
23
necessarily an exclusion of a rational approach.1
B. Acceptable Legislative Oversight Mechanisms
Authors have already pointed out, and cogently so, that
there is not that much substantive difference between the various forms of legislative oversight, including the congressional
12 4
veto.
Among the questions which must be addressed is how one
can find an alternative to the legislative veto acceptable to the
Supreme Court if the Chadha decision does have the broadranging effect it is alleged to have. One assumes that the objective espoused by Congress in opting for the legislative veto is to
maintain a government which is limited and which is responsible under the broad separation of powers doctrine espoused by
the Constitution.
1. Legislative Veto-Criticisms
In 1941, Attorney General Jackson stated that once Congress created an agency and delegated certain powers under its
organic legislation, any interference with the exercise of these
powers would amount to altering the original legislation. This is
25
a conclusory, and therefore questionable, line of reasoning.
It is overstating the case to say that Congress can only interfere with powers delegated to an agency by going through all of
the steps involved in the original legislation. The fact is that
121. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotic Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971), was limited by subsequent Supreme Court decision such as Carlson
v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980), and Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245
(1979). For a discussion on the limitations now imposed on Bivens, see
Hinchcliff, The Limits of Implied Constitutional Damages Actions: New
BoundariesforBivens, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1238 (1980).
122. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
123. Chief Justice Taft, being quoted in, Hampton &Co. v. United States,
276 U.S. 394 (1928).
124. See Martin, supra note 50, at 257 n.9.
125. But see, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (use of
the war powers to justify the internment of Japanese-American citizens in
World War II without due process) which was later criticized in Greene v.
McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) (executive order empowering executive agency
to fashion security program whereby persons are deprived of their civilian
employment without being accorded the opportunity to effectively challenge evidence upon which adverse security determination might rest declared unconstitutional).
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there are just about as many supporters of the legislative veto
as there are opponents.

26

John L Bolton has written a monograph 2 7 in which he
states that the legislative veto is constitutionally weak and
seeks to suggest alternatives which do not quite meet the challenge. Bolton's appraisal of the constitutionality of the legislative veto seems to be right on point some six years prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Chadha. His analysis is thorough,
merits serious study and is not inconsistent with any suggestions put forth here permitting some forms of legislative veto to
survive.
Professor Walter Gellhorn opposes the legislative veto on
the basis that it may have the effect of pressing administrative
regulations and their ultimate decisions into the private arena of
congressional offices.128 This is a most troubling and valid
charge. While I am not entirely sold on the legislative veto as a
constitutionally valid management tool, I nevertheless think
that it is a device that may be used sparingly to retain congressional control over errant executive rulemaking. I readily agree
that such a control mechanism should be severely limited, and I
share Professor Gellhorn's concern not to let legislative oversight become legislative dictatorship which is even more dangerous when it is lodged in the hands of a committee, or worse
yet, in the hands of one individual, the Committee Chairman. 12
But, is it preferrable to have a dictatorship by the President or
by a politically unaccountable bureaucracy?
When a legislative veto provision is built into the original
legislation approved by both houses of Congress and by the
President, all in accordance with the presentation clause (unless the bill became law by virtue of the congressional overturning of the presidential veto), ought it not be argued that any
oversight clause, including the legislative veto, contained in
such a law ought to be tested against the totality of all the facts
126. With some reservations, I would be counted as one of that group.
127. Bolton, supra note 88.
128. Congressional Review of Administrative Rulemaking: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations

of the House Comm on the Judiciary, 94th Cong, 1st Sess. 257 (1975) (testimony of Ernest Gellhorn, professor of law, University of Virginia)
(microfiche, 1976).
129. It seems to me that it is as dangerous to funnel all these decisions to
the White House where non-elected officials decide policy on a day-by-day
basis with only occasional accounting to the Executive in power. See de
Seife, supra note 15. Incidentally, one of the "poor facts" in Chadha is that
the matter involving congressional review was mishandled by the Committee Chairman.
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surrounding the particular case raising the question as to the
validity of the oversight clause?
2. Report and Wait
The legislature could adopt the "report and wait-mechanism" which has been adjudged constitutional in Clark v.
Valeo.130 This is one approach that can be adopted fruitfully by
Congress and one that had already been recognized by Bolton in
his monograph as being constitutionally valid. However, this
procedure is cumbersome. But as stated by Bolton, "the separaquoting Justion of powers was not designed for its efficiency,"
13 1
tice Brandeis' opinion in Myers v. United States.
Negatives involved in the "report and wait" procedure are
spelled out by Boughton. 132 Interestingly, it is noted that both
Presidents Hoover and Roosevelt supported versions of the report-and-wait provisions.133
3. Sparing Delegation of Power
Of course the other option that Congress could and should
exercise more frequently, is not to delegate so much unchecked
discretionary power to the executive. The sparing delegation of
legislative powers would help a great deal and good legislative
drafting would lead to a further tightening of the process.
4. Legislative Drafting with Precision
Congress should endeavor to promulgate its laws in plain
English so that the words utilized would not be subject to constant interpretation by the courts in seeking the "legislative intent" and, in effect, abrogating the plain meaning rule of
statutory construction. It is not casting an aspersion on anyone's position to point out that were we to use the English language in a more circumspect and specific way in drafting
statutes, in order to avoid the elasticity which courts give to legislative words, and if we were to return to the basic "plain meaning" rule of statutory interpretation, this would be immensely
helpful in applying laws in a more commonsensical manner.
130. 429 U.S. 1088 (1977).
131. Bolton, supra note 88, at 6-7, quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S.
52, 293 (1926), overruling, Humphrey's Ex'r. v. United States, 295 U.S. 602,
627 (1935).
132. See Bolton, supra note 127.
133. Id.
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5. Appointments
Congress might want to more effectively use its power over
presidential appointments. To a large extent, even theoretically
perfect institutions are only as good as the people who run
them. For Congress to fall back on the lame excuse that it "defers" as a matter of "courtesy" to a presidential choice is, in my
opinion, a cop-out.
6. Sunset Legislation
Another effective device is the adoption of appropriate limits on the existence of agencies. Thus, if a regulatory agency is
created for a specific period of time, it must justify its existence
if it wishes to have its life-span extended.
7. Possible ConstitutionalChanges
One of the political impacts of the court's decision in
Chadha might be to supply fodder for arguments in favor of
adopting a parliamentary system of government. Such a constitutional amendment, if it is ever to be passed, will take many
years to become effective, during which time the government
still has to function with some modicum of efficiency if we are to
survive without handing over more unchecked power to the
34
executive.
If the Supreme Court is calling for a constitutional convention, which "parliamentarians" would like to see, 135 then let it be
so, and let the Court state forthrightly that the Constitution it is
interpreting is indeed the literal document adopted in 1793, and
that henceforth it will continue to be rigidly and literally interpreted without the elasticity heretofore attributed to that document by previous Courts. This should be a major impetus to the
call for a constitutional convention to realign, reaffirm and redefine the Constitution-the document of the People.
V.

CONCLUSION

Chadha's majority opinion, which ironically has been signed
by one of the most pragmatic of the justices, 3 6 does create political and practical problems which far outweigh the possibly perceived advantages of its proponents. The decision may well
please those who are not happy with any curtailment on the in134. See Adams, Sunset: A ProposalForAccountable Government, 28 AD.
L. REV. 511 (1976).

135. See de Seife, supra note 15.
136. See Cutler, supra note 86.
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crease of presidential powers, 137 as well as those who do not
trust Congress, because of the fear that a "dictatorship of the
people might be worse than the dictatorship of an individual," or
at least not distinguishable from the former. 138 But I submit
that this is not the way to go.
The respect afforded both the executive and the legislative
branches by the judiciary 139 has eroded over the long period of
history since the adoption of the constitution. Traditionally, the
Court tends not to issue opinions which would be more extensive than the case warrants but rather limit its effect to the facts
of the case. 140 The Chadha decision represents a historical departure from that concept and raises speculation as to why.
Absent that, Chadha is, in effect, a bull-in-the-china-shop
decision which may be right in the result reached-as to Chadha
and his five colleagues-but totally wrong in its rationale and
scope. The Court, in denying recent petitions for certiorari involving the legislative veto in other areas, seems to be taking
14 1
Chadha to its ultimate conclusions, which is regrettable.
If it is true that the absence of a dogmatic approach has
been the strength of American judicial thinking in interpreting
the Constitution, then surely it should be feasible to limit the
nefarious effect of Chadha. It would seem to be a little late in
the history of our country for the Supreme Court to become dogmatic about the separation of powers when, in fact, modem
political doctrine would question the practicality of espousing
Montesquieu's total separation of powers theory.
If adjudication means adjudication, and legislation means
legislation, then the Chadha decision, while it may have
achieved the correct result, has done so for the wrong reasons.
Chadha's deportation proceedings were properly upheld by the
Attorney General under his adjudicatory powers, an action
which could have been reviewed in the courts, but which should
not have been reviewed by Congress since it does not have any
constitutionally mandated adjudicatory powers except in very
137. 'The Constitution vests the 'Executive Power' in the President, and
when Congress delegates rulemaking power to offices in the executive
branch, it places that power in an officer responsible to the President and
subject to his controL" Cutler, The Casefor PresidentialIntervention in
Regulatory Rulemaking by the Executive Branch, 56 TuL L REV. 830, 838
(1982).
138. Cooper &Cooper, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution, 30 GEO.
WASH.L REV.467 (1962).
139. The first time the judicial branch "pushed" its powers was in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).
140. See supra note 4.
141. See supra note 8.
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exceptional circumstances. 142
By adopting this straight-forward construction the Court
would have achieved some desirable results: (1) reiterate the
rule of non-interference by a branch of our government into the
activities of another branch and, (2) achieved a just result, but
limited its rationale to situations involving the specific action analyzed in Chadha, namely, the exclusion of an alien from deportation proceedings under the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952. This would not have resulted in a weak, unnecessarily
complex and sweeping decision, which on its face seems to abolish some 200 statutory provisions involving the legislative
veto, 143 some of which are probably, if not patently, constitutional, and others which may well be constitutionally questionable.'" It is indeed strange that of all the Supreme Courts, this
one should take such a wide-ranging action. One may feel compelled to speculate that this may be due to a certain "anti-Congress" sentiment on the part of some of the current justices with
a mixture of "pro-executive" sentiment on the part of some
other of the Brethren. 45 Justice Powell's decision proves once
again that he probably possesses one of the most incisive minds
on this Supreme Court and it is unfortunate that his colleagues
did not heed his call.'4
By declaring the offending clause of the Immigration and
Nationality Act to be severable, the Supreme Court is achieving
exactly the opposite of the congressional intent. 47 To curtail
the powers of Congress to review executive action within the
purview of delegated "legislative power" and to augment executive power without any check, even an imperfect one, is leading
us down the primrose path of the Strong Executive and will require that we seriously look at other options to insure governmental responsiveness to the people.148
142. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2791-92 (Powell, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 2792 (White, J. concurring). White refers to nearly 200 statutory provisions.
144. See supra note 12.
145. See Martin, supra note 50, at 253-56.
146. Id.
147. See supra note 39 for an analysis of Rhenquist's dissent.
148. Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the
Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DuKE L.J. 789, 790 (1983).

With his usual insight, Professor Strauss delves into the distinction of the
use of the legislative veto in areas involving executive-congressional relations as against its use in the regulatory context. None of the Justices, nor
for that matter did any of the parties, see that distinction which would have
permitted the limiting of Chadha'sdecision to the latter area and not affect
the former-a point in support of the argument made in my article. Anyone
interested in this subject matter should read the Strauss article.

